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ABSTRACT
Effects of Management and Media Disclosures of Corporate
Tax Evasion on Investor Judgments
by
CHUA Ming Wei Gabriel
Master of Philosophy

This study examines investor reactions to disclosures of corporate tax
evasion by company management and the media. We were particularly interested in
the issue of whether investors value corporate tax compliance from a moral
perspective. We conducted an experiment in which we manipulate management
disclosure strategies (no disclosure, symbolic disclosure, substantive disclosure) and
the presence/absence of media disclosures in a 3 x 2 between-subjects design.
Participants provided judgments of a hypothetical company’s short-term and longterm financial prospects and their willingness to maintain their investment in the
company.
Media disclosure of tax evasion had a significant effect on all judgments. In addition,
for all judgments there was a significant interactive effect of management disclosure
strategy and media disclosure. This interaction was driven by the particularly strong
negative effects of media disclosure when management made no disclosure of the
evasion (the “caught off guard” effect). In contrast, analysis of simple effects
indicated that if management proactively discloses instances of tax evasion,
subsequent disclosure by the media has no significant effect on investor judgments.
We also document that, relative to a control group, management disclosure of facts
regarding a tax evasion event (in the absence of media disclosure) significantly
reduces investor assessments of the short-term prospects of the company and their
willingness to hold the company’s stock. However, management disclosure of facts
regarding tax evasion had no significant impact on investor assessments of the
company’s long-term prospects. Although recent research on environmental, social
and governance disclosures has documented that the specific form of management
legitimation strategies (symbolic vs. substantive) has significant impacts on investor
judgments, we found no evidence of such effects in our study. Supplemental analysis
revealed that the perceived morality of management mediated the effects of media
disclosures on investor judgments.
Based on the findings we draw several conclusions. Though corporate management
may be tempted to omit disclosure of tax evasion events from the financial
statements, they are likely to pay a high price if the evasion is later reported by
independent third parties. This appears to reflect investor reactions to management
breaches of their expectations regarding moral behavior. In contrast, proactive
management disclosure of the facts surrounding tax evasion events attenuates the
negative effects of future media disclosures. Management disclosure of facts
regarding tax evasion appears to be viewed primarily as a short-term rather than a
long-term threat to a company’s prospects. Given knowledge that tax evasion has

occurred, investors place little credence in management attempts to legitimize the
evasion, even when such legitimation efforts describe detailed and concrete
remediation strategies. Finally, investor perceptions of the morality of company
management (including management commitment to ethics/integrity and corporate
social responsibility) play a key role in their reactions to corporate tax evasion.
Keywords: tax evasion, media disclosure, management disclosure, legitimation
strategies, investor judgments
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1. INTRODUCTION
Tax evasion is a long-standing global phenomenon that impacts multiple
stakeholders and raises issues that have broad social, political, and economic
implications (Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, 1998; Sikka, 2010, 2015).1 In recent
years, companies such as Google, Starbucks, Ikea and Amazon have been charged
with adopting overly aggressive tax planning strategies (Hillenbrand, Brooks &
Tovstiga, 2019; Yang & Metallo, 2018). Tax avoidance/evasion has also attracted
a great deal of attention in the accounting, economics and business ethics literature
in recent decades (Chen & Chu, 2005; Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010; Sikka, 2010,
2015; DeBacker, Heim & Tran, 2015; Crocker & Slemrod, 2005; Andreoni et. al.,
1998; Davidson, Worrell & Lee, 1994; Lanis & Richardson, 2015; Dowling, 2014;
Shafer & Simmons, 2008; Payne & Raiborn, 2018; Bird & Davis-Nozemack, 2018).
The widespread interest in tax avoidance/evasion may be attributed to its
increasing prevalence as well as its potentially negative social and economic
consequences (Hillenbrand et al., 2019; Yang & Metallo, 2018). The U.S. Treasury
estimated the gross tax gap (underpayments) to be $441 billion per year from 20112013 (United States Treasury, 2019), and the tax gap has appeared on the U.S.
Government Accountability Office’s list of high-risk issues for several years
(United States GAO, 2019). Despite such concerns, the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) remains grossly underfunded, and the tax gap for the coming decade
is projected to be as high as $7.5 trillion (Huang, 2021). In an effort to curtail tax
evasion, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
has initiated a Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)
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action plan. The success of the plan, however, remains to be seen (Brooks, Godfrey,
Hillenbrand & Money, 2016).2
Losses of tax revenue reduce the ability of nation-states to improve social
conditions; thus, tax evasion may exacerbate social and economic injustice (Sikka,
2010, 2015; Durante, Putterman & Van der Weele, 2014; You & Khagram, 2005).
Although the significance of tax avoidance/evasion and its negative social and
economic consequences have been widely acknowledged and researched, relatively
little is known about the effects of corporate tax evasion on investor judgments and
decisions. But there is clearly reason for concern regarding this issue. The
emergence of a tax avoidance “industry” aided and abetted by expert accountants
and attorneys (Madison, 2018; Henry, 2015; Johnston, 2004; Sikka, 2010, 2015;
Shafer & Simmons, 2008) suggests that many corporations are willing to play the
“tax lottery”, taking aggressive positions that may cross the line into illegal tax
evasion. The apparent prevalence of such strategies implies that the perpetrators
have little concern regarding the morality of tax evasion, and investors may also
tacitly approve overly aggressive tax reporting. Indeed, questions have often been
raised regarding the extent to which investors really care about corporate tax
evasion (Blaufus, Möhlmann & Schwäbe, 2019; Brooks et. al., 2016; Reynolds,
2020).
The current study aims to gain insights into this issue by investigating
investor reactions to revelations of corporate tax evasion. We adopt an experimental
approach that examines the impact of management disclosure strategies and the
presence/absence of media disclosures of tax evasion events. Management may
adopt a strategy of nondisclosure in a company’s financial statements in the hope
that tax evasion can be effectively concealed. However, if investors are concerned
2

about tax evasion from a moral perspective, they are likely to punish the company
if the evasion is later disclosed by independent third parties. To avoid this
possibility and attempt to preserve corporate legitimacy, management may elect to
disclose the facts regarding tax evasion in the financial statements. Reimsbach &
Hahn (2015) investigated the direct and interactive effects of management and
third-party disclosures of negative events relating to environmental, social and
governance (ESG) issues. However, prior studies have not addressed this issue in
the specific context of corporate tax evasion.3
We also extend previous literature by investigating the effects of alternative
legitimation strategies adopted by corporate managers in their disclosures of tax
evasion. It has long been recognized that organizations may adopt legitimation
strategies as impression management tools in an attempt to mitigate the impact of
negative information on stakeholder perceptions (Gomulya & Mishina, 2017;
Suchman, 1995). Recent studies in the ESG context recognize that legitimation
strategies may be relatively symbolic or substantive in nature (Hahn & Lülfs, 2014).
Hahn, Reimsbach, Kotzian, Feder & Weißenberger (2021) document that when
companies disclose substantive remediation strategies relating to negative ESG
events, this reduces the likelihood of divestment from the company. 4 But the
effectiveness of legitimation strategies used in response to corporate tax
avoidance/evasion appears to be an open question and consequently is addressed in
the current study.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Effects of Media Disclosures of Tax Evasion
Scholars have recognized that independent third parties play a critical role in
monitoring organizations’ actions and uncovering corporate misconduct. Research
3

has documented that independent third parties often serve as “watchdogs” to
uncover negative information about organizations (Kourula & Laasonen, 2010), and
media disclosures are often used to monitor organizations to ensure they act with
good faith and accountability (Hahn, 2011; Haddock-Fraser, 2012).
Kinney (2000) argues that independent third-party sources enhance investor
confidence in corporate disclosures, particularly if the third parties have a reputation
for trustworthiness. Based on a literature review, Mercer (2004) identified thirdparty validation as one of the key factors that investors consider when assessing the
credibility of management disclosures. Signaling theory also recognizes that signals
provided by third parties should generally be more reliable because they are less
susceptible to manipulation than self-reported signals (Gomulya & Mishina, 2017).
This discussion supports the intuitive proposition that investors will view
media disclosures of antisocial or illegal corporate acts as relatively reliable. But
obviously investors must value the signals provided by media disclosures if they are
to influence their decisions. The empirical evidence on this issue is based primarily
on correlational studies of stock price reactions to disclosures, and the results are
somewhat mixed.
In early accounting studies, Foster (1979, 1987) found that companies’ stock
prices fell shortly after Abraham Briloff published magazine articles revealing
negative information regarding their accounting practices. These results are not
surprising given that for decades Briloff was “by far the most prominent accounting
critic” (Norris, 2013). In a study of over 500 reports of corporate illegalities
published in the Wall Street Journal, Davidson et. al. (1994) found that for the
sample as a whole the impact on stock prices was insignificant. However, when they
categorized the reports by type of transgression, they found significant price
4

declines for approximately half of the categories (e.g., bribery, tax evasion, theft of
trade secrets, violations of government contracts). For the other categories, there
were either no significant effects (e.g., accepting kickbacks, criminal fraud,
securities law violations) or positive effects (price fixing). Even for the illegal acts
that had significant negative impacts on stock prices, the effects were only
documented for short time periods.
Many studies have investigated the impact of public disclosure of tax
avoidance/evasion or “tax planning strategies” on companies’ share prices or returns
on investment. The results of these studies have been inconsistent, including
findings of positive, negative and no effects (Blaufus et al., 2019). As noted by
Blaufus et al. (2019), most of these studies failed to make a clear distinction between
legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. To provide more clarity on this issue,
Blaufus et al. (2019) compared the effects of media disclosures of tax avoidance and
tax evasion on stock returns for a sample of German companies. Based on a sample
of 176 newspaper articles that reported corporate tax avoidance/evasion, they found
that legal avoidance had no significant impact, while illegal evasion significantly
reduced returns.5
Studies such as those of Davidson et al. (1994) and Blaufus et al. (2019)
provide some support for the contention that media disclosures of corporate tax
evasion negatively influence share prices and returns on investment. Thus, media
reports of relatively clear cases of tax evasion should negatively influence investor
assessments of a company’s financial prospects and their willingness to maintain
their investment in the company, as indicated in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Media disclosure of corporate tax evasion will have
a negative influence on investor evaluations of their future return
on investment and their willingness to maintain their current level
of investment in a company.
5

2.2 Effects of Management Disclosure Strategies
The documentation of negative impacts of media disclosures of tax evasion on
investor judgments (Hypothesis 1) will not shed light on the underlying reasons for
investor reactions. For instance, even in cases of settled or adjudicated tax evasion,
investors may view management’s actions primarily through an economic rather
than a moral lens. Indeed, many market-based studies of corporate tax
avoidance/evasion appear to emphasize the primacy of economic considerations.
These studies often assume investors will judge tax evasion primarily by weighing
its perceived costs (e.g., fines and penalties) and benefits (lower tax payments)
(Brooks et al., 2016). If moral implications are recognized, they are usually
objectified as “reputational costs” and quantified using proxies such as lost sales
(Blaufus et al., 2019). And as previously discussed, evidence of the prevalence of
corporate tax evasion has led to suggestions that corporations and their tax advisors
(accounting and law firms) often cooperate in complex schemes to evade taxes and
view this process as little more than strategic planning designed to maximize
corporate profits (Sikka, 2010, 2015). If such assertions are true, corporate tax
evasion may have become normalized to some extent.
Aside from evidence of its prevalence, questions have been raised regarding
the perceived morality of corporate tax avoidance/evasion due to uncertainty
surrounding its definition and the degree of wrongdoing involved. The boundary
between aggressive but legal tax avoidance vs. illegal tax evasion is often fluid,
regularly contested and ultimately determined by regulatory authorities or courts
(Shafer & Simmons, 2008). This reflects a process of coevolution between the tax
laws in the U.S. and sophisticated tax avoidance strategies developed to test the
limitations of those laws. This is hardly surprising given the pressure for profit
6

maximization that many corporations face. But it clearly may create ambiguity
regarding the extent of management culpability in many cases of aggressive
corporate tax avoidance/evasion.
Doubts regarding the extent to which investors are concerned about
corporate tax evasion have also been raised by the media. For instance, Reynolds
(2020) recently argued that “Until investors stand up and start to hold multinational
corporations to account, regular citizens will continue to see the Starbucks and
Googles of the world avoiding paying taxes…If the world is to become a more equal
place, investors holding corporations to account on tax is a critical place to start.”
Thus, there are numerous reasons to question whether investors will be particularly
concerned with corporate tax evasion from a moral perspective.
On the other hand, it is apparent from moral and legal perspectives that tax
evasion is a clear breach of corporate management’s obligations to shareholders.
Investors entrust their personal wealth with corporations, and they should expect the
managers of those corporations to act in good faith and in accordance with their
fiduciary responsibilities. Further, evidence clearly suggests that investors are quite
sensitive to the issue of management integrity. For instance, Shafer (2004) found
that investors react negatively to illegal corporate acts even if such acts have no
effect on the numbers reported in a company’s financial statements (such acts are
viewed as material on qualitative rather than quantitative grounds). Shafer (2004)
also documented that investors had particularly strong negative reactions to illegal
acts that involved self-dealing (accepting kickbacks) on the part of corporate
management. 6 Evidence of tax avoidance/evasion also raises obvious concerns
regarding management character or integrity because corporate managers may
increase their performance-based compensation by engaging in overly aggressive
7

tax minimization strategies. Based on these considerations, we believe investors will
value corporate tax compliance from a moral perspective.
The simultaneous examination of media disclosures and management
disclosure strategies can provide insights regarding this issue. In the wake of settled
tax evasion events, corporate managers will adopt a disclosure strategy for how to
address the situation. For instance, management may choose to make no disclosure
of the event at all, and hope that it is not subsequently disclosed by third parties.7 Or
they may disclose the event but attempt to legitimize it in a non-substantive way
designed to minimize negative responses, essentially an attempt to rationalize the
event without taking significant actions to minimize its recurrence. If they are
genuinely concerned about the event, they may adopt concrete and substantive
remediation strategies and proactively disclose these measures in the financial
statements (cf. Hahn et al., 2021).
If management makes no disclosure of the tax evasion, the company may
suffer particularly strong negative effects if the evasion is subsequently disclosed
by independent third parties. This situation was referred to as the “caught off guard”
effect by Reimsbach & Hahn (2015). In their experimental study of environmental,
social and governance disclosures (excluding tax evasion), these authors found that
if management failed to disclose negative events but they were later disclosed by
nonprofit organizations, this had an especially strong negative impact on investors’
estimates of the company’s future stock price and their willingness to maintain their
investment in the company.
Documentation of the caught off guard effect in the context of tax evasion
would provide evidence that investors are concerned about evasion from a moral
perspective. If a company’s financial statements fail to disclose instances of settled
8

tax evasion and the evasion is subsequently disclosed by the media, this sends
highly credible signals that (1) the company engaged in illegal activities; and (2)
company management was aware of these activities but chose not to disclose them.
If investors view this situation from a strategic economic perspective that
ignores moral considerations, arguably neither of these signals should be
particularly troubling. Investors who adopt a cavalier attitude toward aggressive tax
evasion may feel that management was acting in their best interest by attempting to
maximize profits and shareholder value and believe that media detection and
disclosure was simply “bad luck”. Such investors should view nondisclosure by the
company simply as part of the strategic game being played to minimize possible
repercussions of the evasion event. In this case, it does not appear likely that
investors will punish the company to a significant extent for nondisclosure; thus,
we would not expect to find significant interactive effects of management and
media disclosure.
In contrast, if investors view tax compliance from a critical moral
perspective, both signals sent by media disclosure only (tax evasion occurred, and
management attempted to conceal it) should clearly be considered negative
reflections on management character or integrity. The signal of nondisclosure by
management should amplify the negative effects of the event itself by violating
investors’ expectations for fair and honest reporting and reducing their perceptions
of management integrity and credibility (Connelly, Certo, Ireland & Reutzel, 2010;
Gomulya & Mishina, 2017; Karpoff, Lee & Martin, 2008; Karpoff & Lott, 1993).
Consequently, investors should feel that management’s value system is incongruent
with their own (Gomulya & Mishina, 2017; Devers, Dewett, Mishina & Belsito,
2009). Such consequences should decrease investor confidence in the future
9

behavior and performance of the firm (Mishina, Block & Mannor, 2012; Mishina et
al., 2017). Thus, investors who are genuinely concerned about the morality of
corporate tax evasion should react quite harshly to revelations that a company settled
a tax evasion case and management attempted to conceal the evasion. This suggests
that media disclosure and management disclosure strategies will have significant
interactive effects on investor judgments, as indicated in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: There will be a significant interaction between
management disclosure strategies and the presence/absence of
media disclosure of corporate tax evasion. Specifically, the
presence of media disclosure will have a larger negative influence
on investor evaluations of their future return on investment and
their willingness to maintain their current level of investment in a
company when management fails to make any disclosure of the
facts surrounding the tax evasion event.
We also investigate the effects of management disclosure of the basic facts
regarding corporate tax evasion relative to a control group. As observed by Hahn et
al. (2021), when management chooses to disclose facts regarding antisocial or
illegal corporate activities, this poses a risk to the company’s legitimacy. But they
may be willing to take this risk to avoid the potentially greater implications of the
caught off guard effect. When management discloses facts regarding a tax evasion
event, this signals to stakeholders that: (1) the company engaged in illegal acts; and
(2) management chose to disclose the illegal acts. The first signal should have the
dominant effect because it is obviously credible, and it clearly raises concerns
regarding management integrity.
If investors view tax avoidance/evasion as morally reprehensible, disclosure
of facts regarding evasion events in the company’s financial statements should
violate their expectations for high integrity on the part of company management
(Gomulya & Mishina, 2017; Devers et al., 2009). Signaling theory recognizes that
significant violations of expectations make the future behavior and intent of the
10

signaler less predictable and accordingly increase stakeholder apprehension
(Mishina et al., 2012). This should reduce investor expectations regarding the
prospects of the company and their willingness to hold their investment.
The second signal (management disclosure of the event) should not be
viewed very positively by investors. It is likely that some investors (even
nonprofessionals) will realize that disclosure of the facts regarding material illegal
corporate activities is mandated by professional accounting standards. Thus,
management disclosure of the facts surrounding tax evasion simply meets minimum
professional and regulatory requirements and should not be viewed as a signal of
high management integrity. Even if investors are not aware that such disclosures
are mandatory, given knowledge that tax evasion has occurred it seems likely that
they would question the underlying motivation for any voluntary disclosures and
feel they may simply represent a form of “damage control” designed to manage
public impressions. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that management’s choice to
disclose the facts regarding a tax evasion event in a company’s financial statements
will carry any significant positive connotations relative to a control group.8 This
reasoning is reflected in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: If management discloses facts regarding corporate
tax evasion, this will negatively influence investor estimates of
future returns on their investment and their willingness to
maintain their current investment level in a company relative to a
control group (no management disclosure, no media disclosure).

2.3 Effects of Management Legitimation Strategies
Management scholars have long recognized the critical importance of
organizational legitimacy. In their influential article, Dowling & Pfeffer (1975) note
that without legitimacy organizations would be unable to exist. Organizational
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legitimacy theory is based on the idea that there is an implied contract that binds
the organization and society (Chen & Roberts, 2010). This social contract is
analogous to a license to operate, and if there are specific events that breach this
contract, the organization’s existence may be threatened (Hrasky, 2012). This may
be the case when organizational actions are incongruent with society’s expectations
(Chan & Milne, 1999). For example, if an organization commits tax evasion, the
legitimacy of the organization may be at risk if this incident is not considered
appropriate in the eyes of society. Companies may adopt various legitimation
strategies designed to preserve or restore their perceived legitimacy (Suchman,
1995).
According to Hahn et al. (2021), most previous studies of legitimation
strategies have focused on the tactics adopted by organizations to restore
organizational legitimacy. These studies have shown that organizations often
employ such strategies in response to public disclosure of negative corporate
incidents that have the potential to cause reputational damage (Cho, 2009; Deegan,
2002; Deegan & Rankin, 1996; Patten, 1992; Walden & Schwartz, 1997). Hahn et
al. (2021) extend the organizational legitimacy literature by examining the
effectiveness of proactive disclosures designed to preserve legitimacy before public
disclosure occurs. In addition, while prior studies have adopted an organizational
focus, Hahn et al. (2021) add an investor perspective to the organizational
legitimacy literature, investigating investor responses to legitimation strategies
relating to environmental, social and governance issues. In the current study we
extend the work of Hahn et al. (2021) to the context of tax evasion. Previous studies
have not investigated investor reactions to proactive disclosures designed to
preserve organizational legitimacy in cases of corporate tax evasion.
12

Hahn & Lülfs (2014) documented two distinct classes of proactive
legitimation strategies based on their review of company sustainability reports:
symbolic and substantive.9 Symbolic legitimation strategies involve management
disclosures that are relatively superficial and evasive, designed to justify or
rationalize negative incidents. Compared to disclosures of substantive remediation
strategies, symbolic disclosures tend to be disingenuous and designed primarily to
manage public impressions. Symbolic disclosures are not likely to be viewed as
credible signals by investors; consequently, they should be unlikely to alleviate
investor concerns regarding corporate tax evasion. This argument is supported by
studies which document that symbolic disclosure strategies have a relatively low
chance of restoring (Kim, Bach & Clelland, 2007; Marshall & Brown, 2003) or
preserving (Hahn et al., 2021) organizational legitimacy.
In contrast, substantive legitimation strategies involve disclosures of
purported commitments on the part of the organization to rectify their actions and
reduce the likelihood of negative incidents recurring. Such actions should be costly,
concrete and specific in nature (Cho, 2009; Cho et al., 2015). Disclosures of
substantive remediation strategies represent an attempt to convince investors that
management is genuinely committed to high standards of integrity. To the extent
that such disclosures are viewed as credible signals, they should reduce investor
concerns regarding the actions in question. Consistent with this assertion, (Hahn et
al., 2021) found that disclosure of substantive remediation strategies for negative
ESG events reduced the likelihood of divestment from a company.
However, we feel that the impact of symbolic vs substantive legitimation
strategies is questionable in the case of settled tax evasion events. Both symbolic
and substantive disclosures represent claims made by management to allay investor
13

concerns, and in the case of substantive disclosures these claims obviously may be
decoupled from actual internal changes. In any case, if management has disclosed
the facts regarding the tax evasion event, it has been conceded that the company
engaged in illegal activities. This should raise serious concerns regarding
management integrity and credibility. As observed by Gomulya & Mishina (2017,
579), “when the credibility of the signaler is compromised, stakeholders may shift
their relative reliance to signals that are less susceptible to errors and manipulations.”
In the context of our study, the signals that are least susceptible to errors and
manipulations are the media and management disclosures of the basic facts
regarding tax evasion. Thus, it seems likely that investors will place their primary
emphasis on the facts of the case and discount management claims beyond these
facts. For this reason, we do not feel a compelling case can be made for the effects
of the form of management “talk” regarding of tax evasion, and simply pose the
following research question.
Research Question 1: If management’s proactive disclosure of
corporate tax evasion is substantive (vs. symbolic) in nature, will
this have a positive effect on investors’ evaluations of future
returns on their investment and their willingness to maintain their
current investment level in a company?
3. RESEARCH METHOD

3.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
We conducted an experimental study of nonprofessional investors to test the
hypotheses. Management disclosure strategies and media disclosures relating to a
tax evasion event were manipulated in a 3 x 2 between-subjects experimental design
(see Figure 1). We developed a case scenario that involved a dispute with the IRS
that had been settled by the payment of back taxes and penalties. Because the
14

primary focus of our study was on investor reactions to tax evasion, we felt it was
critical to present a relatively clear case of evasion to minimize individual
differences in interpretation of the extent of wrongdoing.
After providing informed consent and responding to demographic questions,
all participants were presented with an investment case and informed that they
currently owned shares in the company discussed therein, and that it was one of the
most profitable investments in their stock portfolio (see Appendix A for the
experimental case). They were then presented with basic background information
on the company and a summary of audited financial information for the past two
years. The case was prepared based on the actual financial statements of a publicly
traded U.S. company, and was anonymized by changing the company name and
adjusting the numbers by a uniform percentage.
[Figure 1 here]
Three alternative management disclosure strategies were tested: no
disclosure, disclosure of facts combined with symbolic legitimation, and disclosure
of facts combined with substantive legitimation.10 Subjects in the no management
disclosure condition simply received the basic background and financial
information for the company. In the symbolic legitimation condition, a financial
statement footnote was added that briefly described the facts relating to the tax
evasion event,11 followed by management discussion that was symbolic in nature.
This symbolic legitimation employed three of the four strategies identified by Hahn
& Lülfs (2014): (1) marginalization (stating that this was the first time the company
had ever been required to pay additional taxes); (2) abstraction (stating that similar
incidents occur regularly in business contexts); and (3) rationalization (stating that
companies often take tax deductions they believe are legitimate but which are later
15

disallowed by the tax authorities; thus, periodic adjustments of tax liabilities by the
authorities are virtually inevitable). The symbolic legitimation discussion
concluded by stating that the company was confident that its management acted in
good faith and believed that the disallowed deductions were legitimate.12
In the substantive legitimation condition participants also received the
financial information and footnote describing the facts regarding the tax evasion
event, but in this case management’s discussion of the evasion included a number
of concrete action steps designed to prevent recurrence, including stating that (1)
the company engaged an independent law firm to investigate the incident and
provide a detailed report to its board of directors and audit committee; (2) as a result
of this investigation, the former director of the company’s tax department was
replaced by a more highly qualified individual; (3) the independent law firm will
be engaged on a continuing basis to review the company’s tax returns before they
are filed; and (4) the company’s internal auditors, who report directly to the audit
committee, will also take a more active role in monitoring the activities of the tax
department. The effectiveness of the manipulation of symbolic vs. substantive
manipulation was tested by asking participants to rate management’s discussion of
the tax evasion in the annual report on three dimensions (10-point Likert scales):
rationalization vs. genuine concern; vague vs. concrete; and symbolic vs.
substantive. An analysis of responses to these checks indicated highly significant
differences for each of the items in the anticipated directions. Thus, the
manipulation appeared to be effective.
The presence of media disclosure was manipulated by adding a separate
section after the main body of the case which indicated that after the financial
statements were issued the tax evasion was reported in the Wall Street Journal. This
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was followed by an illustration of the disclosure, which repeated the same basic
facts regarding the tax evasion that were disclosed by the company in its financial
statement footnotes. This manipulation was checked by asking if there was any
indication in the case that disallowed tax deductions had been publicly reported by
the news media. If participants answered this question incorrectly, the survey was
terminated. Approximately ten percent of potential respondents failed this check
and thus were excluded from the sample.
After the manipulation checks, participants provided several responses to
the case. These included assessments of the short-term and long-term prospects for
their return on investment from the company. Both these assessments were made
on 10-point scales anchored on “negative returns” (1) and “positive returns” (10).
To elicit investment decisions, respondents were asked to assume they were
currently deciding whether to reallocate funds among the investments in their
portfolios, and to decide what action to take regarding their investment in the
company on a 10-point scale anchored on “significant decrease” (1) and
“significant increase” (10). To provide a basis for supplemental analyses,
participants’ perceptions of company management’s commitment to integrity,
ethical values and corporate social responsibility were also assessed on 10-point
scales where 10 indicated higher levels of commitment.
3.2 Sample
We conducted an online experimental survey of nonprofessional investors.
The presence of nonprofessional investors in capital markets has become
increasingly significant; hence their perceptions are of growing importance, yet
they remain understudied (Cohen, Holder-Webb, Nath & Wood, 2011). We
prepared the online version of the instrument on the Qualtrics platform and obtained
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the sample using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Recruiting participants
through MTurk has been common in recent business and accounting studies (e.g.,
Hux, 2021; Sheldon & Jenkins, 2020; Owens & Hawkins, 2019; Brink, Eaton,
Grenier & Reffett, 2019). Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the six
experimental groups.
We conducted an initial pre-test of the instrument in MTurk with a sample
of 30. The results of this test indicated that several participants failed the
manipulation check for the presence of media disclosure. Consequently, we
modified the instrument to emphasize the presence of media disclosures more
clearly. We then conducted a second pre-test and found that the failure rate for this
manipulation was quite low and no other problems were noted. For both the second
pre-test and the main study, we required that participants be “MTurk Masters”, a
designation reserved for those with an established record of providing high quality
work on the platform. We also required that participants have a minimum of one
year of business experience. We paid each participant US$3 for a successfully
completed response. We felt this was a generous amount for a survey that most
respondents completed in fifteen minutes or less, and that it would encourage highquality responses. Subjects were required to respond to all survey questions to
receive payment from MTurk.
For the main survey, we requested 360 responses. In the first day after
publishing the survey on MTurk we received slightly over 200 responses, but the
responses slowed significantly after that. Based on our online discussion with an
MTurk consultant, the relatively slow rate of responses received after the first day
was likely due to the fact that the number of MTurk Masters is limited. After four
days we had obtained approximately 270 responses and there were more than 30
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responses in each experimental cell. At that point we decided to cut off the
responses. We carefully reviewed the responses for unusual patterns (such as highly
consistent responding and short completion times) and deleted approximately 20
responses based on this review.
The final sample was comprised of 251 participants. The distribution of
responses by cell is provided in Table 1. As indicated in the table, with the exception
of cells 2 (no management disclosure, media disclosure) and 3 (symbolic disclosure,
no media disclosure) the number of respondents in each group exceeded 40 and
were approximately equal. Analysis of the data recorded in Qualtrics revealed that
in the case of cells 2 and 3, several participants failed the manipulation check for
the presence of external disclosures, while in the other cells the number of failures
of this check were relatively small. 13 It is not clear why participants in these
particular groups had a higher failure rate on this manipulation check. However, as
discussed below, we empirically tested the effectiveness of the randomization
process among the final sample and noted no problems.
[Table 1 here]
A summary of demographic information for respondents is provided in
Table 2. As indicated in the Table, over 40 percent of participants had over 20 years
of business experience, and over 80 percent had over 10 years of experience.
Almost 90 percent of the sample were over the age of 30. Taken together, these
results indicate that the sample was predominantly comprised of mature individuals
with extensive business experience. Somewhat over half of respondents (56 percent)
were male.
[Table 2 here]

19

To obtain information on investment experience, we asked participants if
they (1) currently owned stock in a publicly traded company; (2) had recently
owned stock in a publicly traded company; or (3) planned to invest in the stock of
public companies in the future. A majority of the sample answered each of these
three questions affirmatively as shown in Table 1. Supplemental analysis indicated
that almost 80 percent of the sample either currently owned shares, had recently
owned shares or planned to invest in the future. Thus, a strong majority of
respondents appear to qualify as actual or potential stock market participants,
suggesting that they are reasonable surrogates for nonprofessional investors.
Approximately 60 percent of participants had annual household income in
excess of $50,000. Given that the median household income in the U.S. was
approximately $68,000 in 2019 and will almost certainly decline in 2020 as a result
of the COVID-19 pandemic (CNN, 2019), it appears likely that the median income
of our sample was just slightly below the national average. Sixty-five percent of
respondents reported possessing a bachelor’s degree or higher; thus, they appear to
be relatively well-educated.
To test the effectiveness of our randomization procedures, in supplementary
analyses we examined the correlations between the case versions and each of the
demographic measures. All these correlations were quite small, and none
approached significance at conventional levels. Since there were no observed
associations between any of the demographic characteristics and the case versions,
it appears that the randomization was effective.
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4. RESULTS
4.1 Correlations
We first tested the correlations among the demographic variables and our other
measures, which are presented in Table 3. Notably, none of the traditional
demographic measures (experience, age, gender, income and education) were
significantly associated with any of the three dependent measures (short-term
prospects, long-term prospects, investment intentions). In addition, none of these
traditional demographic measures were significantly associated with assessments
of management’s commitment to integrity, ethics or corporate social responsibility.
Consequently, these measures were excluded from subsequent analyses.
Participants’ reports of their personal investment horizon (short-term vs. long-term)
were only associated with one of the dependent measures (the company’s long-term
prospects) at the .05 level. Based on this generally weak pattern of associations,
investment horizon was also excluded from further analyses.
[Table 3 here]
Some significant associations were observed between the stock ownership
measures (currently own, recently owned, plan to own shares) and the dependent
variables. In particular, each of these stock ownership measures was significantly
associated with respondents’ assessments of the long-term prospects of the
hypothetical company. The associations between the “currently own” and “recently
owned” variables and assessments of long-term prospects were positive and
significant at the .05 level. These results suggest that active participants in the stock
market tend to be more optimistic regarding future market prospects. 14 A stronger
positive association (r = .218, p ≤ .001) was observed between the “plan to own”
variable and assessments of the long-term prospects of the hypothetical company.
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This result is somewhat intuitive, because investors who plan to invest in the future
should have a more positive view of the long-term prospects of the market that
predispose them to assess the prospects of a particular company more positively.
The plan to own variable was also positively associated with investment decisions
at the .05 level. Due to the associations between the stock ownership measures and
the dependent variables, we ran alternative versions of our ANOVA models (see
discussion below) that included each of the stock ownership variables as covariates.
These models revealed significant positive associations between plans to invest in
the stock market in the future and both assessments of the hypothetical company’s
long-term prospects (p ≤ .01) and the likelihood of increasing their investment in
the hypothetical company (p ≤ .05). However, the inclusion of these variables had
no influence on any of the ANOVA results reported herein; consequently, the stock
ownership variables were also excluded from subsequent analyses.
Another interesting aspect of the correlations is that the stock ownership
variables were significantly associated with certain assessments of management
morality. Those who planned to own shares of public companies in the future rated
the integrity, commitment to ethical values, and commitment to social
responsibility of company management relatively high (p ≤ .05). Participants who
reported recently owning shares also rated the integrity and ethical values of
company management somewhat higher (p ≤ .05). And current shareholders rated
the ethical values of management relatively high (p ≤ .05). It seems reasonable to
expect that individuals who are predisposed to have higher levels of trust in public
companies and their management would be more likely to (plan to) invest in the
stock market, which could explain the observed relationships.
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The correlations among the three dependent measures (short-term prospects,
long-term prospects and investment decisions) were all highly significant. The
correlation between short-term and long-term prospects (r = .410, p ≤ .001) is not
so large that it raises concerns regarding the distinctiveness of the measures. It
should also be noted that participants’ estimates of the company’s long-term
prospects were more strongly correlated with investment decisions (r = .630) than
were assessments of short-term prospects (r = .462). This finding is consistent with
the fact that a strong majority (204/251) of respondents indicated that they adopt a
long-term investment horizon. Highly significant (p ≤ .001) correlations were also
observed among the dependent measures and assessments of the morality of
company management. Evaluations of the integrity, ethical values and commitment
to social responsibility on the part of company management were more strongly
associated with estimates of long-term (as opposed to short-term) prospects for
return on investment. This finding suggests that nonprofessional investors believe
that higher levels of management morality will tend to be rewarded in the longterm. The strongest correlations were obtained for the association between the
morality measures and investment decisions. This result is consistent with the
findings for short-term and long-term prospects and indicates that nonprofessional
investors are more willing to increase their investment in a company when they feel
that management morality is relatively high. This finding is consistent with existing
literature which suggests that investors are more likely to invest in companies with
higher ethical values and commitment to CSR (Gödker & Mertins, 2018).
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4.2 Hypothesis Tests
To test the hypotheses, we ran ANOVA models for each of the dependent
measures. 15 The model for short-term prospects for return on investment is
presented in Table 4. Panel A of the Table presents the ANOVA results, while Panel
B presents the means (standard deviations) by experimental cell.
[Table 4 here]
The ANOVA model indicates that the main effect for the presence of media
disclosure was highly significant, providing support for Hypothesis 1. Thus,
participants’ assessments of the short-term prospects of the company were
significantly and negatively influenced by the presence of media disclosure of tax
evasion. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the management disclosure strategy by
media disclosure interaction was also highly significant. It is evident from the cell
means in Panel B of the table that this interaction was primarily due to the strong
impact of media disclosure when management made no disclosure of the tax
evasion event at all. Tests of simple effects confirmed this observation. The mean
difference between groups 1 (control group) and 2 (media disclosure only) was
highly significant (p = .000).16 In contrast, the mean difference between groups 3
(symbolic disclosure, no media disclosure) and 4 (symbolic disclosure, media
disclosure) was only marginally significant (p = .055), while the difference between
groups 5 (substantive disclosure, no media disclosure) and 6 (substantive disclosure,
media disclosure) was insignificant. These results indicate that if management
proactively discloses a tax evasion event (either symbolically or substantively),
subsequent media disclosure will have little impact relative to the case of no
management disclosure.
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To test Hypothesis 3, we performed simple contrasts of mean responses
between the control group (no management disclosure, no media disclosure) and
groups 3 (symbolic disclosure, no media disclosure) and 5 (substantive disclosure,
no media disclosure). The results indicate that both these differences were highly
significant (group 1 vs. 3 mean difference = 1.1, p = .008; group 1 vs. 5 mean
difference = 1.1, p = .004). As is evident from the Table, any form of management
disclosure of the facts regarding a tax evasion event (symbolic or substantive)
decreased investors’ assessments of the company’s short-term prospects relative to
the control group.
To test Research Question 1, we performed simple contrasts of the mean
differences between groups 3 (symbolic disclosure, no media disclosure) and 5
(substantive disclosure, no media disclosure) and between groups 4 (symbolic
disclosure, media disclosure) and 6 (substantive disclosure, media disclosure).
Neither of these differences approached significance, and it is apparent from Table
4 that the differences in perceived short-term prospects between the symbolic and
substantive groups were negligible. The results of the manipulation check for
legitimation strategies indicated that participants viewed the symbolic disclosures
as non-substantive, non-concrete rationalizations relative to the substantive
disclosures, yet these differences had no impact on assessments of the company’s
short-term financial prospects. These results indicate that, given knowledge of the
fact that corporate tax evasion has occurred, investors tend to dismiss management
“talk” regarding the tax evasion event.
The ANOVA model for perceptions of the company’s long-term prospects
is presented in Table 5. The results presented in Panel A follow the same general
pattern observed for short-term prospects, though the effects are weaker. The main
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effect for media disclosure was highly significant (p = .001), again consistent with
Hypothesis 1. The interaction of management disclosure strategy and media
disclosure was also significant (p = .028), which provides further support for
Hypothesis 2. An analysis of the mean responses by experimental condition in
Panel B of the Table indicates that as anticipated this interaction was driven by the
difference between the control group and group 2 (no management disclosure,
media disclosure). Tests of simple effects revealed that this difference was highly
significant (p = .000), though it was much less pronounced than that observed for
short-term prospects. Tests of the simple effects between groups 3 (symbolic
disclosure, no media disclosure) and 4 (symbolic disclosure, media disclosure) and
between groups 5 (substantive disclosure, no media disclosure) and 6 (substantive
disclosure, media disclosure) revealed that neither difference was significant. As in
the case of short-term prospects, these results indicate that management disclosure
of the basic facts regarding tax evasion attenuates the negative impact of subsequent
media disclosure.
[Table 5 here]
To test Hypothesis 3, we again relied on simple contrasts between the
control group and groups 3 (symbolic disclosure, no media disclosure) and 5
(substantive disclosure, no media disclosure). These differences were not
significant at conventional levels (group 1 vs. 3 mean difference = .42, p = .249;
group 1 vs. 5 mean difference = .62, p = .106). Thus, management disclosure of the
facts regarding a settled tax evasion event had no significant impact on investor
assessments of the company’s long-term prospects.
The contrasts of mean differences between groups 3 (symbolic disclosure,
no media disclosure) and 5 (substantive disclosure, no media disclosure) and
26

between groups 4 (symbolic disclosure, media disclosure) and 6 (substantive
disclosure, media disclosure) were insignificant. Thus, Research Question 1 was
not supported. Consistent with the results for short-term prospects, it appears that
the form of management legitimation strategies (symbolic vs. substantive) for a tax
evasion event had little influence on investor assessments of the company’s longterm financial prospects.
Table 6, Panel A presents the ANOVA results for investment decisions.
Consistent with the results for short-term and long-term financial prospects, the
main effects of media disclosure and the interactive effects of disclosure strategy
and media disclosure were highly significant. It is evident from the analysis of mean
results in Panel B that the interaction effect was again due to the relatively large
negative impact of media disclosure when company management made no
disclosure of the tax evasion event. This was confirmed by analysis of simple
effects. The mean difference between groups 1 and 2 was highly significant (p
= .000), while the differences between groups 3 (symbolic disclosure, no media
disclosure) and 4 (symbolic disclosure, media disclosure) and between groups 5
(substantive disclosure, no media disclosure) and 6 (substantive disclosure) were
insignificant, indicating that media disclosure of corporate tax evasion has little
impact on investment decisions when company management has previously
disclosed the facts regarding the tax evasion in the financial statement footnotes.
Thus, the findings for investment decisions supported Hypotheses 1 and 2.
[Table 6 here]
The test of Hypothesis 3 revealed highly significant differences between the
control group (group 1) and both groups 3 (symbolic disclosure, no media
disclosure) and 5 (substantive disclosure, no media disclosure) (group 1 vs. 3 mean
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difference = .93, p = .006; group 1 vs. 5 mean difference = .99, p = .005). Consistent
with the hypothesis, management disclosure of the facts regarding a tax evasion
event significantly decreased investors’ intentions to maintain their current
holdings of the company’s stock relative to the control group.
The test of Research Question 1 (again based on simple contrasts between
groups 3 vs. 5 and 4 vs. 6) found that symbolic vs. substantive management
legitimation strategies had no significant effect, and the mean differences between
these groups were negligible as indicated in the table. Consistent with the results
for short- and long-term financial prospects, although participants viewed the
symbolic disclosures as relatively vague rationalizations, this had no appreciable
impact on their investment decisions.
4.3 Supplemental Analysis
To obtain insights regarding the role of perceived management morality in investor
decision-making, we elicited perceptions of company management’s commitment
to integrity, ethics, and corporate social responsibility. We ran mediation models to
examine the associations among the experimental manipulations (management
disclosure and media disclosure), perceptions of management morality and the
three primary dependent measures (short-term prospects, long-term prospects and
investment decisions). Due to high inter-correlations among the three measures of
management morality, we combined them into a single variable.17 The results of the
analyses for the media disclosure manipulation are presented in Table 7 and in
Figures 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
[Table 7, Figures 2, 3, 4 here]
Consistent with our ANOVA results, the effects of management disclosure
strategy (no disclosure, symbolic disclosure, substantive disclosure) had no
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significant (direct or indirect) effects on investor judgments; thus, the results of
these models are not presented herein. The model for the effects of media disclosure
on short-term prospects is presented in Panel A of Table 7 and in Figure 2. The
analysis reveals that media disclosure had highly significant direct effects on
estimates of short-term returns. The links between the media disclosure
manipulation and perceptions of management morality and between management
morality and estimated short-term prospects were also highly significant. Based on
a 95 percent bootstrapped confidence interval, the indirect effect of media
disclosure was significant. Thus, perceptions of management morality partially
mediated the relationship between media disclosures of corporate tax evasion and
the estimated short-term returns on investments in the company’s stock.
The model for long-term prospects, presented in Table 7 Panel B and Figure
3, indicates that assessments of the long-term potential for return on investment
were fully mediated by perceptions of management morality. The direct path
between the media disclosure variable and estimates of long-term prospects did not
approach significance. In contrast, the media disclosure/perceived morality and
perceived morality/long-term prospect links were both highly significant. The
bootstrapped 95 percent confidence interval indicated that the negative indirect
effect of media disclosure on the estimated long-term prospects of the company was
significant.
The model for investment decisions is presented in Panel C of Table 7 and
Figure 4. The results are similar to those for short-term prospects. The direct
association of media disclosure with investment decisions was significant and
negative. Once again, both links of the mediation path were highly significant and
a bootstrapped confidence interval confirmed the significance of the indirect effect.
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Thus, perceptions of management morality partially mediated the effects of media
disclosure of tax evasion on participants’ willingness to hold the company’s stock.
Taken together, the results of the supplemental analysis suggests that investor
perceptions of management morality play a critical role in their reactions to media
disclosures of tax evasion.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Based on our empirical results we draw a number of conclusions. As
anticipated, media disclosure of tax evasion events had significant negative effects
on nonprofessional investors’ judgments of a company’s short- and long-term
financial prospects and their willingness to hold the company’s stock. For all
judgments, we also found significant interactive effects of media disclosure and
management disclosure strategies regarding tax evasion, though this effect was less
pronounced for assessments of long-term prospects. These results suggest that
nonprofessional investors value corporate tax compliance from a moral perspective
and punish companies for attempts to conceal settled tax evasion events. Our
findings also reveal that, provided management discloses the basic facts regarding
tax evasion events, subsequent media disclosure will not have significant negative
effects on investor judgments or decisions. Thus, although company management
may be tempted to conceal tax evasion events, they are likely to face significant
negative consequences if the evasion is subsequently disclosed by reputable third
parties. On the other hand, if they comply with their professional and ethical
obligations for full and fair disclosure, subsequent media disclosure should have
little impact.
We also found that if management discloses the facts surrounding a tax
evasion event (in the absence of media disclosure), this has highly significant
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negative effects on investors’ judgments of the company’s short-term financial
prospects and their willingness to maintain their current investment in the company
relative to a control group. However, management disclosure of facts regarding tax
evasion had no significant impact on investor assessments of the company’s longterm financial prospects. This finding indicates that, even in relatively clear and
material cases of tax evasion, participants felt the financial impacts would be
relatively fleeting and would be “shrugged off” by financial markets in the longterm.
Our results also indicate that, given knowledge that tax evasion has occurred,
investors place little reliance on management attempts to legitimize the evasion.
Specifically, we found no differences in investor responses to tax evasion under
conditions of symbolic vs. substantive management disclosure strategies. Although
participants felt that symbolic disclosures were vague attempts at rationalization
lacking in genuine concern relative to substantive disclosures, this had no influence
on their judgments of the company’s prospects or their investment decisions. These
results contradict recent findings in the broader ESG context (Hahn et al., 2021),
and suggest that investors tend to dismiss management “talk” in cases that involve
relatively clear instances of tax evasion. Thus, management’s breach of trust with
shareholders appears to be the dominant signal sent by their disclosures of facts
regarding corporate tax evasion. In the wake of such disclosures, management has
quite limited ability to legitimize tax evasion events, even if their disclosures
describe specific, concrete and substantive remediation strategies.
Our supplemental analysis indicated that perceptions of management
commitment to integrity, ethical values and corporate social responsibility play an
important role in investment decisions. Notably, media disclosure of tax evasion
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not only directly influenced investor assessments of the short-term prospects of the
company and their willingness to hold the company’s stock but also indirectly
influenced their judgments through perceptions of management morality. In
addition, perceptions of management morality fully mediated the negative impact
of media disclosure of tax evasion on investor assessments of the long-term
prospects of the company. Taken altogether, these findings indicate that
nonprofessional investors value management commitment to ethics and social
responsibility as a matter of principle, beyond mere instrumental considerations.
There are a number of possibilities for extending this line of research. We
found no significant correlations between participants’ income levels and their
reactions to disclosures of tax evasion. But this may be due to the fact that the
dispersion of income levels for our sample was relatively small, with few
participants having very high incomes. Future studies could investigate the effects
of income levels on tax evasion attitudes using samples that include a sufficient
number of taxpayers with very high incomes. It is often observed that higher income
individuals have both stronger incentives and more resources to engage in
corruption (Sikka, 2015, 2010; You & Khagram, 2005). In the context of tax
evasion, greater resources provide access to expensive tax and legal services
provided by accounting and law firms. This issue has received significant media
attention in the U.S. recently, with many articles suggesting that wealthy taxpayers
and corporations often enjoy low tax rates as a result of complex legal machinations
(e.g., Cohen, 2021; Corbett, 2021; Huang, 2021; The New York Times Editorial
Board, 2021). Such observations raise the possibility that high income individuals
have relatively cavalier attitudes toward tax avoidance/evasion, which should be of
significant interest to policymakers.
32

The current study focused on disclosures of a settled tax evasion event that
arose in the most recent fiscal year of the company. Many alternative situations are
also of interest. For instance, as reported by Goldstein (2021), Robert Smith, the
CEO of Vista Equity Partners, recently settled one of the largest tax evasion cases
in U.S. history, and Vista investors “barely blinked”. The lack of a significant
reaction by investors was attributed primarily to the fact that Vista had been
periodically disclosing facts regarding the tax evasion investigation as the case
developed over a four-year period. This echoes the finding of our study that,
provided management discloses the facts regarding tax evasion events, subsequent
media disclosure has little impact on investor judgments and decisions.
The Vista case also raises at least two issues that scholarly researchers may
wish to address. First, what are the effects of management disclosures of facts
regarding ongoing tax investigations in multi-year settings? Multi-year
investigations of suspected cases of tax evasion are quite common in the U.S., and
it may be the case that if management discloses facts regarding such investigations
from their inception to conclusion this will brace investors for the eventual outcome
by signaling a high level of concern by management with full and fair disclosure.18
Second, in the Vista case the tax evasion charges were leveled at the CEO himself
rather than the investment fund. Nevertheless, Vista obviously recognized that
charges of personal improprieties by top management could have a damaging effect
on the company itself, raising concerns regarding management character. Future
studies may also investigate issues arising from the commission of tax evasion by
members of top management teams. For instance, will the negative effects of tax
evasion on investor perceptions be limited primarily to cases involving CEOs, or
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will such effects extend to improprieties by other members of the top management
team or the company’s Board of Directors?
Another area of potential research is the effects of taxpayers’ personality
traits on their attitudes toward aggressive avoidance/evasion. For instance, elements
of the Dark Triad (narcissism, Machiavellianism and psychopathy) (Muris,
Merckelbach, Otgaar & Meijer, 2017) may predispose taxpayers to view aggressive
avoidance/evasion

strategies

primarily

from

an

economic

perspective.

Machiavellianism is perhaps most relevant in this context because it is well-known
that high Machiavellians are characterized by cold and calculating attitudes and a
relative lack of concern with conventional social norms of morality (Christie & Geis,
1970; Muris et al., 2017). If dark personality traits are significantly associated with
advocacy of aggressive corporate tax avoidance/evasion strategies, this implies that
governments should invest more in the detection and punishment of tax evaders,
because individuals who possess dark personalities will not be easily influenced by
appeals to morality, civic virtue or social responsibility as motivations for tax
compliance.
There are other important individual differences that appear likely to aid our
understanding of attitudes toward aggressive tax avoidance/evasion. For instance,
ideological beliefs and worldviews such as a social dominance orientation (e.g.,
Jost & Thompson, 2000; Azevedo, Jost, Rothmund & Sterling, 2019) may be
particularly helpful in explaining differences in the propensity to condone tax
evasion. However, such ideological beliefs have been largely ignored in the tax
evasion literature. A social dominance orientation includes both a desire for groupbased dominance and support for inequality (Jost & Thompson, 2000), both of
which may motivate a strong desire for wealth accumulation and the rationalization
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of tax evasion. The influence of such ideologies on attitudes toward tax evasion
could be investigated in future studies.
This is the first experimental study of investor reactions to disclosures of
settled tax evasion events. It is subject to limitations commonly associated with
experimental research. In particular, experimental studies rely on somewhat
simplified decision contexts that may not be reflective of actual practice. We took
certain measures designed to mitigate this problem, such as using a case study based
on an actual public company’s audited financial statements. We also felt it was
important to provide participants with the complete set of financial information and
disclosures before soliciting their judgments, thus requiring them to discriminate
among the more or less important information as in actual practice. The study was
not incentivized; consequently, participants’ attention to the task was likely weaker
than that involved in actual investment decisions. We attempted to control for this
issue by using attention checks and by carefully screening the data for abnormal
response patterns. In addition, we believe the compensation for participation was
relatively generous (US$3 for a survey most subjects completed within 15 minutes),
which should have helped motivate adequate levels of attention.
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LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix A: Investment Case
Background and Financial Information (received by all participants):
Hightech Inc. is one of the most profitable holdings in your stock portfolio. The
company was incorporated on April 1, 1996 and listed on the NASDAQ in July
2005. The primary business activity of Hightech is the manufacturing and sale of
sensor devices for use in commercial, engineering and medical applications. The
company currently sells its products in more than 50 countries.
The following information was taken from the audited financial statements of
Hightech for the two years ending December 31, 2019. These statements were
issued in March 2020.

Revenue
Gross profit
Income before taxes
Income after taxes
Earnings per share
Total assets
Total liabilities
Stockholders’ equity
Cash flows from operations
Share price

For the period ended
December 31, 2019
$254,000,000
201,000,000
160,000,000
133,000,000
2.55
743,000,000
9,000,000
734,000,000
129,000,000
$80

For the period ended
December 31, 2018
$225,000,000
181,000,000
156,000,000
118,000,000
2.10
711,000,000
8,000,000
703,000,000
121,000,000
$65

Company management is very optimistic regarding the company’s future
prospects. The company’s vision is to be the leading producer of sensor devices
and it has plans to market its products to the automobile industry. Due to the
projected growth in demand for advanced sensors in automobiles, management
believes this market will result in large increases in sales and profitability over the
next several years.
Manipulation of Management Disclosure Regarding Tax Evasion:
(1) No Disclosure:
No mention of tax evasion.
(2) Disclosure of Tax Evasion with Symbolic (Highlighted) Response:
The following information was disclosed by Hightech’s management in a footnote
to the Company’s 2019 financial statements (this information has not been
publicly disclosed by the news media):
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Federal Income Taxes
The Company’s income tax return for 2018 was audited by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) during 2019, and some problems arose during the
audit. Specifically, the Company had taken certain tax deductions during
2018 which were determined by the IRS to be in violation of the current
tax code. As a result, the IRS disallowed these deductions, resulting in an
increase in taxes payable of $12.5 million. The IRS also imposed a tax
penalty that was equal to the amount of additional taxes payable ($12.5
million). Thus, the total additional payment required was $25 million.
This was the first time the Company has ever been required to pay
additional taxes and penalties by the IRS. Similar incidents occur
regularly in business – companies often take certain tax deductions they
have reason to believe are legitimate, but which are later disallowed by
the tax authorities. Thus, periodic adjustments of tax expense and
liabilities by the authorities are virtually inevitable. The Company is
confident that its management acted in good faith and believed that the
disallowed deductions were legitimate.
(3) Disclosure of Tax Evasion with Substantive (Highlighted) Response:
The following information was disclosed by Hightech’s management in a footnote
to the Company’s 2019 financial statements (this information has not been
publicly disclosed by the news media):
Federal Income Taxes
The Company’s income tax return for 2018 was audited by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) during 2019, and some problems arose during the
audit. Specifically, the Company had taken certain tax deductions during
2018 which were determined by the IRS to be in violation of the current
tax code. As a result, the IRS disallowed these deductions, resulting in an
increase in taxes payable of $12.5 million. The IRS also imposed a tax
penalty that was equal to the amount of additional taxes payable ($12.5
million). Thus, the total additional payment required was $25 million.
The Company takes such matters very seriously and is committed to
upholding high standards of ethics and social responsibility. In response
to the IRS disallowance of certain tax deductions, the Company initiated
several specific actions designed to minimize the chance of similar
occurrences in the future. An independent law firm was engaged to
investigate the incident and provide a detailed report to the Company’s
Board of Directors and Audit Committee. As a result of this investigation
the Director of the Company’s tax department was replaced by a more
qualified individual. In addition, the independent law firm will be engaged
on a continuing basis to review the Company’s tax returns before they are
filed. The Company’s internal auditors, who report directly to the Audit
Committee of the Board of Directors, will also take a more active role in
monitoring the activities of the tax department.
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Manipulation of Media Disclosure Regarding Tax Evasion:
(1) No External Disclosure:
No mention of media disclosure regarding tax evasion.
(2) External Disclosure
After the financial statements were issued, the following information was publicly
reported by the news media, specifically in The Wall Street Journal:
Date: 20 April, 2020
Sensor Devices Company required to pay additional taxes and penalties
Hightech Inc., a sensor devices company, took certain tax deductions during 2018
which were determined by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to be in violation of
the current tax code based on an audit of the Company’s tax return. These
deductions were disallowed by the IRS and the Company’s tax liability for 2018
was increased by $12,500,000 as a result. Under the terms of a settlement
agreement, the company was required to repay the unpaid taxes of $12,500,000
plus a 100 percent penalty of $12,500,000 (total additional payment of
$25,000,000).
Concluding Remarks and Questions (received by all participants, parenthetical
comments added):
You have held shares of Hightech’s common stock for approximately two years
and have earned a total return on the shares (dividends plus appreciation) of
approximately 20 percent per year.
Based only on the information provided above, please indicate your answer to the
following questions.
1. Was there any indication in the case that tax deductions disallowed by the IRS
were publicly reported by the news media, specifically in the Wall Street Journal?
Yes / No (manipulation check for external disclosure, survey terminates here if
answered incorrectly)
2. How would you rate Company management’s response to the disallowed tax
deductions and the fine imposed by the IRS as discussed in the annual report
disclosures? (manipulation checks for symbolic vs. substantive legitimation, only
applicable to the four internal disclosure conditions)
1
2
Rationalization
Concern
1
2
Vague

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
10
Genuine

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
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10
Concrete

1
2
Symbolic

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Substantive

3. How would you rate the short-term prospects of HighTech in terms of return on
your investment?
1
2
Negative returns
returns

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
10
Positive

4. How would you rate the long-term prospects of HighTech in terms of return on
your investment?
1
2
3
Negative returns
returns

4

5

6

7

8

9
10
Positive

5. Assume you are currently evaluating your stock portfolio and considering
whether you should reallocate some of your investments. With respect to your
investment in HighTech, would you be more likely to increase or decrease your
current investment amount?
1
2
3
Significant decrease
increase

4

5

6

7

8

9
10
Significant

6. Based on the information in the case, how would you rate the integrity of
HighTech’s top management?
1
2
Low Integrity

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
10
High Integrity

7. Based on the information in the case, how would you rate the ethical values of
HighTech’s top management?
1
2
Unethical

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Ethical

8. Based on the information in the case, how would you rate the commitment of
HighTech’s top management to corporate social responsibility?
1
2
Not committed
committed

3

4

5

6
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7

8

9
10
Highly

ENDNOTES
1

We focus on illegal tax evasion in the current study but recognize that various types of
aggressive tax avoidance may occupy a “gray area” between legal avoidance and illegal evasion.
Although firms engaging in aggressive tax avoidance claim to be operating within the law, tax
authorities periodically initiate legal proceedings against them and their “avoidance” strategies are
sometimes ultimately deemed to be illegal tax evasion (Sikka, 2010; Yang & Metallo, 2018).
Because the distinction between aggressive avoidance and illegal evasion is not always clear and is
often contested, we often use the phrase “tax avoidance/evasion” herein.
The issue of reducing tax avoidance/evasion has been on the G20’s agenda since the financial
crisis of 2008. The BEPS action plan, however, was only introduced in mid-2016 and it is still in
the implementation stage. The action plan is not mandatory, but currently 135 countries have
opted to participate in the plan. The BEPS plan consists of 15 actions, of which four are minimum
standards (OECD, 2016). Some examples of the minimum standards include country-by-country
reporting and prevention of tax treaty abuse. Given that the plan is not fully operationalized, it will
take some time for any potential reductions in tax evasion to be seen.
2

3

We note that corporate tax evasion is clearly a social issue, and it often reflects weak corporate
governance. But prior studies of the impacts of ESG transgressions on investors have largely
ignored tax evasion.
4

ESG events have been the focus of much previous research on corporate legitimation strategies
(e.g., Patten, 1992; Walden & Schwartz, 1997; Deegan, 2002; Deegan & Rankin, 1996).
5

Due to the ambiguity often present regarding the legality of aggressive tax avoidance, Blaufus et
al. (2019) relied on a panel of experts (including tax researchers and graduate taxation students) to
read the news stories and rate the legality of the events described on a five-point scale. Based on a
mean split of these ratings, the events were classified as either legal avoidance or illegal evasion.
6

This general argument is supported by a great deal of research in social psychology and
management. As noted by Paruchuri, Han & Prakash (forthcoming), it has been widely recognized
and documented in the signaling theory literature that capability and character are two
fundamental dimensions of impression formation (e.g., Connelly, Ketchen, Gangloff & Shook,
2016; Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2007; Park & Rogan, 2019; Stellar & Willer, 2018). Further,
research has found that signals relating to character generally have primacy over those relating to
capability (Beckert, 2006; Gomulya & Mishina, 2017; Jensen, 2006). Consequently, signals that
raise concerns regarding management integrity should be particularly salient to investors.
Disclosure of settled or adjudicated tax evasion events that materially impact a company’s
financial statements is required by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However,
the long history of documented cases of financial statement fraud clearly illustrates that
companies’ strategic disclosure decisions are often decoupled from professional and regulatory
requirements (e.g., Knapp, 2015).
7

8

It should be noted that Reimsbach & Hahn (2015) found that proactive management disclosure of
negative environmental, social and governance events did not have a significant negative impact
on investor judgments relative to a control group. They argue that such disclosures signal that
company management is proactively dealing with the issues, which should mitigate investors’
concerns. However, Reimsbach & Hahn (2015) focused on ESG events involving “questionable
business conduct” along the disclosing company’s supply chain. Thus, company management was
not directly implicated in antisocial or illicit activities. Under these circumstances there should be
no clear negative signal regarding the character of company management; consequently, it is
reasonable to expect that management’s proactive disclosures regarding transgressions by its
suppliers would be viewed as a positive reflection on management integrity.
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9

Hahn & Lülfs (2014) further identified six specific types of legitimation strategies used by
companies in their sustainability reports, two of which were classified as substantive and four of
which were classified as symbolic. The substantive strategies included disclosures of corrective
actions of two types: (1) the provision of relatively imprecise ideas, intent or measures to reduce
the likelihood of negative incidents recurring; and (2) the provision of concrete ideas, intent or
measures to prevent recurrence. The disclosure of relatively imprecise remediation measures did
not significantly influence investor behavior in the Hahn et al. (2021) study and consequently we
omit this strategy from further discussion. The four symbolic disclosure strategies included (1)
marginalization (e.g., claiming that the negative events were irrelevant, unimportant or neglible);
(2) abstraction (e.g., generalizing the negative events as being prevalent in practice); (3)
rationalization (e.g., highlighting certain benefits or purposes that excuse the incidents, or
suggesting that such events are normal, natural or inevitable occurrences; and (4) authorization
(e.g., referring to authorities or authoritative sources to excuse the incident). We adopt the first
three of these symbolic strategies in our experimental manipulations.
10

Recent studies of the effects of corporate disclosures on investor judgments (e.g., Hahn et al.,
2021) have adopted a sequential approach that presents relevant information to participants
incrementally, assesses their judgments at each step, and uses the changes in their judgments
(difference scores) as the primary dependent measure. For instance, we could have first presented
participants with disclosure of the basic facts regarding tax evasion, assessed their judgments, and
then presented the additional management disclosures designed to legitimize the evasion event
followed by a reassessment of judgments. We chose not to adopt this approach because it has
relatively low external validity. In the case of financial statement disclosures, in actual practice
users will be presented with all financial information and the complete footnotes, and they must
screen the information and select which elements (signals) are most relevant to their judgments.
To better capture the reality of this process, many behavioral accounting studies present
participants with a relatively complete set of information as a basis for their judgments and
decisions (Chan & Milne, 1999). This approach provides a stronger test of the effects of
disclosures on investor judgments because it does not explicitly highlight or emphasize the
information of primary interest. It is also apparent that requiring multiple within-subjects
judgments may create demand effects. If participants are asked to provide judgments based on
partial disclosures, then presented with additional information and asked to make the same
judgments again, it seems quite likely they will believe they are expected to change their initial
judgments in a certain way.
11

Specifically, the footnote indicated that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audited the
company’s prior-year tax return, and that certain deductions taken by the company for tax
purposes were deemed to be in violation of the tax code and thus disallowed, resulting in an
increased tax liability (see Appendix A). The case also indicated that the IRS imposed a penalty on
the company of 100 percent of the increased tax liability. To help ensure the salience of the event
to participants, the amounts of the additional taxes payable and the fine imposed by the IRS were
set above traditional materiality thresholds which are usually around five percent of earnings
(Acito, Burks & Johnson, 2019).
12

In the context of our study, it was not apparent how the fourth symbolic strategy (making
references to authoritative sources to justify the incident) could be employed. This is at least
partially due to the fact that we survey nonprofessional investors who are unlikely to be familiar
with corporate tax law, and consequently we did not reference any specific or detailed violations
of the tax code. As noted, the four major categories of symbolic strategies were proposed by Hahn
& Lülfs (2014) based on an extensive review of the strategies adopted by many companies;
consequently, one would not expect all the strategies to apply to any given incident.
13

When surveys are prepared in Qualtrics and published in MTurk, the results are recorded in
Qualtrics. Qualtrics records information on all attempted responses, so it is easy to determine the
number of participants who failed this type of manipulation check because their responses end at
the point of the check.
This result could be interpreted as counterintuitive in the case of respondents who “recently
owned” shares, because it could be argued that such investors may have disposed of their stocks due
to a negative outlook on the market. However, it should
41 be noted that there was significant overlap
14

between the “currently own” and “recently owned” cohorts, with many participants answering both
questions affirmatively.
15

As previously discussed, we omitted the demographic measures from our ANOVA models
based on their weak correlations with the primary variables of interest. We ran alternative versions
of all the ANOVA models reported herein that included all the demographic variables as
covariates. These models indicated that neither age, experience, gender, income, nor education
level were significantly associated with any of the three dependent measures. Only isolated
significant effects for stock ownership and short-term vs. long-term investment horizon were
noted. Most importantly, the inclusion of the demographic measures in the models had negligible
effects on all the results obtained for the two manipulated variables and their interactions.
16

All p-values reported herein are based on two-tailed tests.

17

As indicated in Table 3, the correlations among the three morality measures all exceeded .75,
raising questions regarding whether they should be treated as distinct measures. We ran an
exploratory factor analysis of the three items and found that they all loaded very highly on a single
dimension (loadings ranged from .90 to .96). The inclusion of such closely associated measures in
the same linear model would pose serious threats of multicollinearity. Based on these
considerations we elected to combine them into a single measure.
18

We recognize that such situations may raise legal issues and there may be limitations on
disclosures of ongoing investigations; thus, care should be taken to ensure that experimental cases
are realistic.
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Table 1: Distribution of Participants’ Responses

No Media

Media

disclosure

Disclosure

44

35

79

Symbolic Management Disclosure

38

43

81

Substantive Management Disclosure

46

45

91

Column total

128

123

251

No Management Disclosure

43

Row Total

Table 2: Demographics
Business experience in years
1-5 years
6-10 years
11-15 years
16-20 years
more than 20 years
Total

Frequency
11
35
44
54
107
251

Percent
4.4
13.9
17.5
21.5
42.6
100.0

21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
>60
Total

Frequency
32
103
67
38
11
251

Percent
12.8
41.0
26.7
15.1
4.4
100.0

Male
Female
Total

Frequency
140
111
251

Percent
55.8
44.2
100.0

Frequency
141
110
251

Percent
56.2
43.8
100.0

Frequency
155
96
251

Percent
61.8
38.2
100.0

Frequency
173
54
24
251

Percent
68.9
21.5
9.6
100.0

Age

Gender

Currently own stock
Yes
No
Total
Recently owned stock
Yes
No
Total
Plan to invest in stock in the future
Yes
Uncertain
No
Total
44

Household income

<20,000
20,000-34,999
35,000-49,999
50,000-74,999
75.000-99,999
>100,000
Total

Frequency
23
37
46
78
31
36
251

Percent
9.2
14.7
18.3
31.1
12.4
14.3
100.0

Frequency
73
136
24
4
14
251

Percent
29.1
54.2
9.6
1.6
5.6
100.0

Education level
High School
Bachelor's
Masters
PhD
Other
Total

45

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients
Exp
Variable
Exp

Mean

Age

Gender

Own

RecOwn

PlanOwn

Inc

Ed

ST.LT

STPros

LTPros

Invest

Integ

Ethics

1

Age

.711***

1

Gender

.102

.220***

1

Own

-.081

-.167**

-.184**

RecOwn

-.048

*

**

.825***

PlanOwn

*

*

.587

***

.605***

.383

***

***

-.156

-.154
-.202

**

-.191

-.147

Inc

.003

-.056

.022

Ed

-.016

.030

.120

ST.LT

-.103

-.173

**

-.107

1

.004
.296

***

1
.334

-.064
.190

**

1
.258***

1

.047

.081

.251

***

.165

1

**

-.040

1

STPros

5.98

2.14

.097

.112

.078

-.010

.037

.021

-.030

.033

-.005

1

LTPros

7.24

1.93

.048

.064

-.017

.128*

.142*

.218***

.078

.090

.135*

.410***

.079

.462

***

.630***

.389

***

.588

***

.631***

.378

***

.575

***

.605

***

.938***

.342

***

.453

***

.504

***

***

Invest
Integ
Ethics
CSR

CSR

S.D

5.34
5.90
5.75
5.46

1.79
2.29
2.30
2.21

.014
.072
.113
.050

.008
.093
.118
.062

-.003

.041

.066

-.031

.123

.152

*

-.023

*

.138

*

.019

.129

.023

.041

.151

*

.159

*

.150

*

.132

*

Note:
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.00 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed.
Legend:
Exp: Years of Working experience
Own: Currently own stock of public companies
RecOwn: Recently owned stock of public companies
PlanOwn: Plan to invest in the stock of public companies in the future
46

.059
.107
.113
.018

.090
.086
.096
.032

.051
.045
.035

1
1
1
.767

1
.779***

1

Inc: Income
Ed: Education
ST.LT: Self-report of short- vs. long-term investment horizon
STPros: Perceptions of the short-term financial prospects of the hypothetical company
LTPros: Perceptions of the long-term financial prospects of the hypothetical company
Invest: Decisions regarding future investment in the hypothetical company
Integ: Perceptions of management integrity
Ethics: Perceptions of the ethical values of management
CSR: Perceptions of management’s commitment to corporate social responsibility
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Table 4: Short-term Prospects
Panel A: ANOVA Results
Source

DF

SS

MS

F-Statistic

p-value

Corrected model

5

228.770

45.754

12.250

0.000

Disclosure strategy

2

0.891

0.446

0.119

0.888

Media disclosure

1

156.731

156.731

41.962

0.000

Disclosure strategy x

2

81.584

40.792

10.921

0.000

245

915.087

3.735

media disclosure
Error

Panel B: Descriptive statistics
Media disclosure

No

N

No

n

Yes

n

Row total

44

7.455

35

4.229

79

5.842

(0.291)
Yes – Symbolic

38

Disclosure by
the company?

6.368

(0.327)
43

(0.314)
Yes –

46

Substantive
Column total

6.326

6.716
(0.171)

81

(0.295)
45

(0.285)
128

5.512

(0.219)

5.644

(0.215)
91

(0.288)
123

5.128
(0.175)

5.940

5.985
(0.203)

251

5.976
(2.139)

Note: Panel B reports means (standard deviations) and the number of participants in
each cell.
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Table 5: Long-term Prospects
Panel A: ANOVA Results
Source

DF

SS

MS

F-Statistic

p-value

Corrected model

5

64.506

12.901

3.634

0.003

Disclosure strategy

2

1.233

0.617

0.174

0.841

Media disclosure

1

41.920

41.920

11.809

0.001

Disclosure strategy x

2

25.768

12.884

3.630

0.028

245

869.669

3.550

media disclosure
Error

Panel B: Descriptive statistics
Media disclosure
N

No

n

Yes

n

Row
total

No

44

7.977

35

(0.284)
Disclosure by the
company?

Yes –

38

Symbolic
Yes –

46

7.348

43

7.626
(0.167)

7.023

45

7.133

81

6.805
(0.171)

7.288
(0.210)

91

(0.281)
123

7.117
(0.213)

(0.287)

(0.278)
128

79

(0.318)

(0.306)

Substantive
Column total

7.553

6.257

7.241
(0.198)

251

7.243
(1.933)

Note: Panel B reports means (standard deviations) and the number of participants in
each cell.
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Table 6: Investment Decisions
Panel A: ANOVA Results
Source

DF

SS

MS

F-Statistic

p-value

Corrected model

5

110.417

22.083

7.798

0.000

Disclosure strategy

2

0.297

0.149

0.053

0.949

Media disclosure

1

70.247

70.247

24.806

0.000

Disclosure strategy x

2

42.705

21.352

7.540

0.001

245

693.798

2.832

media disclosure
Error

Panel B: Descriptive statistics
Media disclosure
N

No

n

Yes

n

Row
total

No

44

6.477

35

(0.254)
Disclosure by the

Yes – Symbolic

38

company?

5.553

46

Substantive
Column total

5.478

43

5.836
(0.149)

5.023

45

5.067

81

4.773
(0.153)

5.288
(0.187)

91

(0.251)
123

5.353
(0.191)

(0.257)

(0.248)
128

79

(0.284)

(0.273)
Yes –

4.229

5.272
(0.176)

251

5.338
(1.793)

Note: Panel B reports means (standard deviations) and the number of participants in
each cell.
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Table 7: Mediation Analysis
Panel A: Short-term Prospects
Consequent
Morality

Short-term Prospects

Antecedent

Beta

SE

P

Constant

6.26

0.18

.000

Morality

-

-

-1.15

0.26

Media Disclosure
Model F (p-value)
R Squared

Beta

SE

P

4.72

0.40

.000

-

0.32

0.06

.000

.000

-1.16

0.25

.000

19.43
(.000)

35.70
(.000)

0.07

0.22

Panel B: Long-term Prospects
Consequent
Morality

Long-term Prospects

Antecedent

Beta

SE

P

Beta

SE

P

Constant

6.26

0.18

.000

4.45

0.34

.000

Morality

-

-

-

0.51

0.05

.000

-1.15

0.26

.000

-0.20

0.21

.341

Media Disclosure
Model F (p-value)
R Squared

19.43
(.000)

61.34
(.000)

0.07

0.33
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Panel C: Investment Decisions
Consequent
Morality

Investment Decisions

Antecedent

Beta

SE

P

Beta

SE

P

Constant

6.26

0.18

.000

2.78

0.30

.000

Morality

-

-

-

0.49

0.04

.000

-1.15

0.26

.000

-0.47

0.18

.011

Media Disclosure
Model F (p-value)
R Squared

19.43
(.000)

81.62
(.000)

0.07

0.40
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Experimental Groups

No Management Disclosure

No Media Disclosure
1

Media Disclosure
2

3

4

5

6

Symbolic Management
Disclosure
Substantive Management
Disclosure
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Figure 2: Mediation – Media Disclosure, Morality and Short-term Prospects

Perceived
Morality

-1.15***

.32***

Short-term
Prospects

Media Disclosure

-1.16***

Note: ***Significant at p = .000 level
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Figure 3: Mediation – Media Disclosure, Morality and Long-term Prospects

Perceived
Morality

-1.15***

.51***

Long-term
Prospects

Media Disclosure

-.19

Note: ***Significant at p = .000 level
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Figure 4: Mediation – Media Disclosure, Morality and Investment Decisions

Perceived
Morality

-1.15***

.49***

Investment
Decisions

Media Disclosure

-.47*

Note: *Significant at p = .05 level; *** Significant at p = .000 level
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